

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

| | | | | |
|--|--------|-----------|------------------------|---------------------|
| SUBJECT: (Optional) Security Violations -- Staff Directive No. 42 | | | | |
| FROM: C/AS/ICS | | EXTENSION | NO. DCI/ICS 83-4807 | DATE 10 May 1983 |
| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) | DATE | RECEIVED | FORWARDED | OFFICER'S INITIALS |
| 1. [redacted] LL/ICS | 10 MAY | 10 MAY | | |
| 2. [redacted] | | | | |
| 3. [redacted] C/CIPC | 12 May | | | |
| 4. [redacted] | | | | |
| 5. [redacted] EO/ICS | 11 May | | | |
| 6. [redacted] | | | | |
| 7. Miss Eloise Page DD/ICS | 12 May | | | |
| 8. [redacted] | | | | |
| 9. [redacted] D/ICS | 5/12 | | | |
| 10. [redacted] | | | | |
| 11. C/AS/ICS for dist. [redacted] | 5/13 | | | |
| 12. [redacted] | | | | |
| 13. [redacted] | | | | |
| 14. [redacted] | | | | |
| 15. [redacted] | | | | |

Attached is a memorandum to the DCI regarding IC Staff involvement in the delivery of classified material to uncleared personnel on the Hill. Also attached for your signature is an IC Staff Directive establishing procedures to preclude delivery to uncleared personnel on the Hill.

5-7149
Suggest we send memo forward to DCI and wait until [redacted] return for final action on the Directive [redacted] will be back 12 May but we should probably try to get this up to the DCI as soon as possible.

STAFF COORDINATION RECORD

SUBJECT: Security Violations
Staff Directive No. 42

ACTION OFFICE/ACTION OFFICER:

C/AS/ICS

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COORDINATION: For your information.

| OFFICE/OFFICER | INITIALS | DATE |
|--|---|---------------|
| C/CIPC | <i>See Comments</i> | <i>5/6/83</i> |
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COMMENTS:

C/CIPC :
I concur with the proposed staff directive, but with one reservation. I asked, but was unable to ascertain the total volume of material going to work from ICS. If handle most of what we send at present, then there is no problem; if however, this means they are going to spend most of their time as couriers, neglecting their liaison, representational or internal staff work, we will have to modify the directive to allow use of couriers, but only thru them. I suggest we try it as it now stands for 30 days and see what the true impact may be.

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STAFF COORDINATION RECORD

SUBJECT: Staff Directive No. 42
Security Violations

ACTION OFFICE/ACTION OFFICER:
C/AS/ICS

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COORDINATION: For your comments.

| OFFICE/OFFICER | INITIALS | DATE |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|-----------|
| <input type="text"/> LL/ICS | <input type="text"/> | 10 MAY 83 |
| <input type="text"/> C/CIPC | | 12 MAY 83 |
| | | |
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COMMENTS:

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

10 May 1983

Staff Directive No. 42

DELIVERY OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL TO CAPITOL HILL

1. There have been several instances recently of classified intelligence-related material being delivered to personnel on Capitol Hill who were not cleared at the appropriate level for that material. To ensure that classified material originated within ICS is delivered only to authorized personnel on the Hill, the procedures outlined in paragraph two below will be implemented immediately.

2. ICS components will coordinate all classified material prepared for Congressional offices with the Legislative Liaison Staff (LLS). The material will then be sent to the ICS Registry for document control, wrapping, and notification to LLS that the material is ready for delivery to the appropriate Capitol Hill recipient. LLS will determine whether the material will be delivered by CIA couriers or by a member of LLS. Other ICS personnel will not deliver material to Capitol Hill.

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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

DCI/ICS 83-4807

12 May 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:


Director, Intelligence Community Staff

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SUBJECT: Security Violations

1. In response to your inquiry dated 25 April 1983, which was predicated upon a letter of complaint from Senator Ted Stevens, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, the Intelligence Community Staff conducted an investigation to determine what involvement, if any, our Staff had in the security violations cited by Senator Stevens in his correspondence to the DCI.

2. Discussions with Registry, Security and Legislative Liaison officers assigned to the Staff revealed that there was a recent security infraction which indirectly involved the IC Staff. In February 1983, two separate letters were prepared for delivery to Senator Ted Stevens and Representative Joseph Addabbo by the DCI's secretary at the Executive Office Building. Apparently this correspondence was placed in envelopes bearing the return address of the IC Staff. The letters were given to Agency couriers assigned to Headquarters by the DCI's secretary for delivery to Capitol Hill. Unfortunately, the couriers were not aware that Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) was included in the letters. In delivering the correspondence, the couriers left the material with uncleared personnel in the offices of Senator Stevens and Representative Addabbo.

3. While the IC Staff was not directly involved in this particular infraction, we have issued a Staff Directive requiring that all material destined for Capitol Hill be coordinated with our Legislative Liaison officers who will ensure that it is properly addressed. The material will then be delivered by CIA couriers or by one of our Legislative Liaison officers. It is our belief that this procedure will preclude future incidents of improper delivery of material to the Hill. We realize fully the nature of Senator Stevens' complaint and want to convey to him and all members of the Appropriations Committee a spirit of security consciousness.

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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Security Violations

Distribution: DCI/ICS 83-4807

Original - Addressee

- 1 - Security Violations File
- 1 - Chrono
- 1 - ICS/REG
- 1 - C/CIPC
- 1 - LL

DCI/ICS/AS/SEC/

10 May 1983

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REFERENCE

IC STAFF

Routing Slip

| TO: | ACTION | COORD | INFO |
|---|--------|-------|--------------|
| EO/ICS | | | <i>Rm</i> |
| D/ICS | | | X |
| DD/ICS | | | X |
| EA-D/ICS | | | |
| SA-D/ICS-EP | | | X |
| CIPC | | | X |
| LL | | X | |
| PPS | | | X |
| PBS | | | X |
| COMIREX | | | X |
| SIGINT | | | X |
| HUMINT | | | X |
| FIPC | | | X |
| IHC | | | X |
| SECOM | | | X |
| CCIS | | | X |
| SECRETARIAT | | | |
| <i>AS / Security</i> | X | | |
| REGISTRY | | | |
| DDCI | | | |
| SUSPENSE: <i>6 May</i> Date | | | |
| REMARKS: AS: please prepare a report to DDCI on the incident cited and prepare a memo to the staff on procedures per DDCI memo. | | | |

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Reg.

83-2211/2

25 APR 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Director, National Security Agency/
Chief, Central Security Service
Under Secretary of the Air Force

SUBJECT: Security Violations

1. By the attached letter, the DCI has been informed of numerous security violations on the part of member agencies of the Intelligence Community pertaining to delivery of intelligence-related material to the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense. These would appear to have arisen from either a lack of knowledge of the proper procedures or disregard of standard security practices, for which there can be no excuse.

2. It is especially disturbing and particularly embarrassing that these breaches have occurred on Capitol Hill, where it is vital that the Intelligence Community display the high level of security discipline which we claim to practice and demand. From the example cited by Senator Stevens, it would certainly seem that we are not practicing what we preach.

3. I therefore request that you take the following actions:

-- immediately investigate the circumstances of the violations cited by Senator Stevens and report the results to me; and

-- ensure that all personnel involved in the delivery of classified information to the Hill are fully briefed and understand the procedures cited in Senator Stevens' letter.

4. I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of strict adherence to all necessary security procedures. Every effort should be expended to prevent security violations of this or any other kind.

John N. McMahon

Attachment:
Ltr from Senator Stevens
dtd April 8, 1983

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DCI
EXEC
REG

Executive Registry

83-2211

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 8, 1983

ALASKA
 JACKSON, JR., CONN.
 CLARK, EDWARD
 T. MEV.
 UTAH
 JENSEN, MRS.
 ANDREWS, N. DAK.
 ANDERSON, S. DAK.
 JIMMY W. EASTEN, JR., WIS.
 JOSEPH M. D'AMATO, N.Y.
 JACK MATTHEWS, GA.
 LAWRENCE GOODMAN, N.J.
 ARLEN SPECTER, PA.
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 J. DONNETT JOHNSTON, LA.
 WALTER D. MIDDLETON, KY.
 GAVIN H. BURDICK, N. DAK.
 PATRICK J. LEAHY, VT.
 JIM BASSER, TEXAS
 DONALD DE CONING, ARIZ.
 DALE BUMPERS, ARK.

J. KEITH KENNEDY, STAFF DIRECTOR
 FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

The Honorable William J. Casey
 Director of Central Intelligence
 Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Director:

Once again the Committee must notify you of a series of violations to our security standards. As outlined in our letter of June 18, 1982, all classified information pertaining to intelligence and intelligence-related material must be delivered to room SD-122 or SD-119 and signed for by a staff member specifically cleared to receive such information.


None of my other offices either in the Capitol or in the Russell Office Building should receive classified information since staff members there do not have necessary clearances and no secure storage exists at these locations. Nor should classified data intended for Appropriations Committee use be delivered to another committee. Recent violations have involved deliveries by the Intelligence Community staff, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, [REDACTED] In each of these cases, information was either left with uncleared personnel, was not signed for, or was delivered to another room or committee.

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Please instruct your staff again of our policy so that we may ensure classified information receives the full protection to which it is entitled.

With best wishes,

Cordially,



TED STEVENS

Chairman

Subcommittee on Defense